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SARTREAN FEMINIST ETIDCSI
("Play in a Sartrean Feminist Ethics" is apart of A Fem;n;s' Elh;es 0/Freedom, fol1hcoming from
Rowman & Liuletield Publishers, reprinted by pennission.)
A feminist existentialist ethics, such as I am proposinr here, will agree
with Jean-Paul Sartre's moral judgment condemning the denial of freedom while
at the same time affirming that each person must choose her or bis own values.
Tbe claim that each must choose values, however, is not unproblematic.
Inherent in this claim is a relativism of values, frequently challenged by those
who claim that tbe recognition of values as arbitrary and unjustifiable renders
difficult and highly unlikely-or impossible-any individual's continued
adherence to particularly demanding moralities. Even sympathetic critics have
expressed fear that Sartre's and Simone de Beauvoir's "willingness to put their
lives and honor on the line in support of human dignity seems to bear witness
to tbe very spirit of seriousness tbey so scomfully reject. ,,3
Equally problematic is the recognition of futility. For Sartre, futility is in
inevitable aspect of the human situation. For others, like Alison Jaggar, futility
is recognized when she points to ". . . the problem of discovering viable ways
of living. . . with contradictions that are presently ineradicable... Tbe difficulty
I As part of a larger manuscripl, this paper owes much to the careful readings, critiques, and
ediling of Diane L. Fowlkes and Albert C. Skaggs. In addition, Olga Skorapa was extremely helpful
when I consulted her about the direclions I was taking lhe concept of play.
2 This is part of a larger project, a book-Iength manuscript, tentalively tilled ..A Feminist
Ethics of Freedom...
lrhomas C. Anderson, The Foundalion and S'rue'ure 0/ Sat1rean EI/lies (Lawrence: The
Regents Press of Kansas, 1979), p. 149.
281
is created by the fact that feminist wornen must live and act in an already
constructed world with intricate power relations: "When racism, capitalism and
male dominance are seen to penetrate political organizations, the home and even
the bedroom, socialist feminist women are left with no place of refuge from the
struggle. They are always on the front lines." Sincethese contradictions are at
least for now unresolvable, requiring as they do fundamental changes in the
structure of society, Jaggar concludes that feminists ". . . must discover how to
live with these contradictions in such a way as to find not despair and defeat, but
joy and strength inthe struggle against them...4
My belief that play may help to provide the needed answers had its
inspiration in two sources. One was Sartre's ethics, in which play is seen as a
way of resolving problems resulting from the choice of values in a situation
where there will always be ambiguity and failure. The other inspiration was
references to play and playfulness in writings by feminist theorists. Sometimes
these writings refer to playas a revolutionary strategy. Sometimes they refer to
play or playfulness as a joyful celebration of freedom and love, however
circumscribed these may be by oppressive structures and by threats of violence.
Frequently they suggest something similar to Sartre's use of play.
Like Sartre, Sarah Hoagland recognizes the ability to embrace arnbiguity
as essential to morality; and, Iike Sartre, she proposes that playfulness makes
such embrace possible. She cites Maria Lugones's idea of "playful world travel"
as a way to "Ieam to love cross-eulturally and cross-racially." Hoagland
describes this playful world travel as "the ability to suspend not belief, but
disbeliej. It is not our belief so much as our disbelief that leads us to discount
others and keeps us loyal to patriarchal perception. "S Here play seems both a
revolutionary strategy and a way to live with relativism. This dual role also is
ascribed to play in Annette Kolodny's "playful pluralisrn," "'... responsive to
the possibilities of multiple critical schools and methods, but captive of none,
4Alison Jaggar, Feminist Politics and Human Nature (Tolowa, NJ: Rowman& Allanheld, 1983),
pp.345-46.
5Sarah Lucia Hoagland, Lesbian Ethics (Palo Aho, CA: Institute of Lesbian Sludies, 1988), p.
242.
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recognizing that the many tools needed for our analysis will necessarily be
largely inherited and only partly of our own making. ,"6
In this paper, then, I examine first the role play can serve in constructing
resolutions to problems of both relativism and futility. In these resolutions, I
draw heavily from Sartre's work and from my own earlier analysis of his
ethics.7 Finally, with help from many disparate sources, I explore the
revolutionary possibilities of play.
P1ay and the Spirit of Seriousness
Sartre contrasts play with the "spirit of seriousnes$" in which the "serious
man" tries to give bimself "the type of existence of the rock, the consistency,
the inertia, the opacity of being-in-the-midst-of-the-world... One who is serious,
Sartre says, is concemed with consequences: "[A]t bottom [be] is biding from
himself the consciousness of his freedom; he is in bad faith and bis bad faith
aims at presenting himself to his own eyes as a consequence; everything is a
consequence for hirn, and there is never any beginning. That is why be is so
concemed with the consequences of his acts. "8
Play is concemed with consequences, too, but in a different way. The
serious person sees consequences as beyond her or his control; indeed, such an
individual sees herself or himself as a consequence of other causes. In play, on
the other hand, consequences are viewed as the resuIt of free activity. Play is
"an activity of which man is the first origin, for whicb man himself sets the
mies, and which has no consequences except according to the rules posited!"
Play begins "(als soon as a man apprehends himself as free and wishes to use
his freedom, a freedom, by the way, which could just as weil be his anguish,
6Annelle Kolodny. "DancingThrough the Minefield: SOlne observations on the Theory, Practiee,
and Politics of a FeOlinist Litcrary Critieism," Won,en anti Values: Readings in Recenl Feminisl
Philosophy, ed. Marilyn Pearsall (Belmont, CA: Wadswonh Publishing Co., 1986), p. 252.
1See Linda A. Bell, Sartre's Elhics 01 Authenlicil)' (fuscaloosa: The University of Alabama
Press, 1989).
8Jean-Paul Sal1re, Being and NOlhingness. trans. Hazel E. Harnes (New York: The Philosophieal
Library, 1956), p. 580.
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then his activity is play. The first principle of play is man himself; through it he
escapes his natural nature; he himself sets the value and mies which he has
established and defined."9
In Cahiers pour une morale, Sartre presents playas a break from the spirit
of seriousness and as vitally connected with authenticity. In discussing risk, he
says,
I don 't prove my freedom only by the pure subordination of the exterior world; I
prove it also in agreeing to struggle against it. . . . At the same time the ehallenge is
play: it is a rnpture with the spirit of seriousness, [it is) expenditure, annihilation,
passage to the festive side. The festival in etTeet is liberation from the spirit of
seriousness, the expenditure of eeonomies, the Nin of hierarchy, and the absorption
of the other by the Same, of the objeetive by intenubjeetivity, of order by disorder.
Thus the apocalypse will be one of the extreme types of human relations.lO
Such play is not a leisure-time activity. Here Sartre differs from Johan
Huizinga's proposal in the latter's famous study of play.l l Herbert Marcuse
is closer to Sartre's understanding of play when he describes it as "the play of
Iife itself, beyond want and extemal compulsion, " not because wealth and leisure
have freed those who play from constraint, but rather because the "constraint
[which] ;s tbe reality ... 'loses its seriousness' and ... its necessity 'becomes
light. '" This play changes human activity into "display-the free manifestation
of potentialities." 12
Sartre's play is also quite different from the contest-play of which
Huizinga writes. While "the primary thing" of Huizinga's contest-play is to
excel over others, Sartre's play seems compatible with non-eompetitive
behavior. However, they would agree that if and when playful activity involves
9Ibid ., pp. 580-81.
1°Sartre, Cahiers pour une n.orale (paris: Gallimard, 1983), p. 388. This and all other eitations
of Cahiers are my own translations.
11Johan Huizinga, Hon.o Ludens: A SlIuly 0/the Play-elen.enl in Cullure (Boston: Beaeon Press,
1950), p. 8.
12Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilizalion: A Philosophicallnquiry inlo Freud (Boston: Beaeon
Press, 1955), pp. 187, 190.
284
competitiveness, tbis competitiveness is not, as Huizinga says, "in the first place
adesire for power or a will to dominate. "13
Play as Partial Resolution to the Problems of Relativism
On the basis of these statements about play, along with a little help from
observations about ordinary play, we can construct resolutions to the problems
of relativism and futility. These resolutions must deal, first, with both Sartre's
denial of any preexisting justifications for our action and bis affirmation of the
necessity of creating and sustaining in existence our own values. Second, the
resolutions must support continued activity even in the I.ight of full recognition
of a gap between our goals and our acco'mplishments that, given human freedom
and reality, even God could not bridge.
In play, we create without being bound by any preexisting values,
prescriptions, and proscriptions. Children at play may create characters,
dialogues, situations, and actions. While many of these may merely mirror the
scenes they have witnessed, some are quite different and even reflect values that
differ considerably from those taught by and evinced in the lives of parents and
teachers. Adults invent games and sustain them in existence, for example, by
freely following the rules they have created, thus "playing the game. "
Sartre's authentie individuals must create their own values through their
actions; moreover, they must recognize that their choices of these values are not
necessary and are neither supported nor justified by anything whatsoever. Like
one who invents agame, those who are authentie know they could have chosen
differently; but, like the creator of the game, they in fact made a certain choice
and not another. To say that they chose is to say that they brought certain values
and not others into being. This does not mean, however, that the decisions are
irrevocable. Rather, these individuals remain free to revoke the chosen values
as values. What they cannot do is to abolish the fact of their having chosen these
values.
Whereas both the creator of the game and the authentie individual are
thereafter free to alter or reject their game and chosen value, respectively, both
individuals may choose not to alter or reject and instead continue to act in
accordance with their choices. There is 00 gap, much less an unbridgeable one,
lJHulzlnga. Homo Ludens, p. 50.
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between the choice of a value and action in accordance with the choice.
Choosing and acting are simply not separable. To assume one can choose
without acting or act without choosing, or avoid bolb choosing and acting,
certainly is to assume a position foreign to Sartre's. To choose a value is to act,
in appropriate circumstances, on that choice; similarly, to act is to make value
choices. If Sartre is correct, one can avoid neither choice nor action. Not to
choose is itself a choice, and, generally , not to act is itself an action.
If the problem is that of sustaining one's commitment, particularly to
demanding values, in the face of the realization that one's chosen values have
no extemal, objective justification, play offers aresolution. Although this may
be a more empirical and less properly philosophical problem, at least an analogy
with other forms of play suggests that the psychological problem may not be as
serious as some believe. After all, countless individuals have developed and
participated in games that demand extraordinary preparation, skilI, and exertion.
Surely some of these individuals were aware that there were other, less
demanding possibilities no more (and, of course, no less) objectively warranted
or justified.
The very question "Why would an individual continue to affirm previously
chosen values?" either ignores the fact that any other values would be equally
arbitrary or it assumes that we are free to cease choosing and acting. We may
choose to end agame or discontinue a project. We may even do so for what we
consider good and compelling reasons. If, however, we recognize that there are
00 such reasons for continuing the game or the project on which we have been
working, surely this, in itself, is insufficient reason to drop it. To play this
objectivist game of demanding good and compelling reasons, and to do so even-
handedly, requires that there be sufficient reason for whatever we do-even if
we discontinue the project. Too many fail to recognize that for every "Why?"
there is a "Why not?" that is just as difficult to answer. Many a project may be
completed for no hetter reason than that it was initiated.
Doesthis invalidate commitment, as critics have affirmed? Maurice
Merleau-Ponty's challenge seems especially serious: "From the single fact that
it is a question of committing oneself, that the prisoner is also his own jailer, it
is clear that one will never have other bonds thanthose one currently gives
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oneself and that one never will be committed. ,,14 This challenge is partially
correct: one is never completely bound by what one has chosen or done. ODe
can always free oneself from the direction specified by past choices and actions.
However, to the extent Merleau-Ponty is correct, what he says indicates more
an advantage than a disadvantage in the view of freedom to which he is
objecting. His challenge becomes a significant objection to tbe possibility of
commitment only when it is conjoined with bis view of Sartrean freedom as the
"pure power of doing or not doing, apower that fragments freedom into so
many instants, ... the freedom to judge, which even slaves in chains have. "15
Yet tbis is a view of freedom Sartre, in his 1946 essay "Materialism and
Revolution," quite rigbtly rejects as a "pure idealistic h~ax. ,,16
From Sartre's analysis of freedom and retlection, I conclude that
commitment is meaningful at each of two levels. First, in choosing, one may
attempt to engage the future, to bind future decisions by making conflicting
decisions as difficult as possible. This level of commitment is paralleled in
Sartre's later writing by what the group does in its attempt to restrict or bind in
advance, by promises and by terror, the freedom of its members. This level of
commitment seems to be avital aspect of many if not all choices inasmuch as
many acts of will involve at least some reference to a prolongation ioto the
future of what is chosen. As de Beauvoir says, "I can not genuinely desire an
end today without desiring it through my whole existence, insofar as it is the
future of this present moment and insofar as it is the surpassed past of days to
come. To will is 10 ellgage myself 10 persevere in n,y will [emphasis mine]. "17
The practical import of this feature of will is that in acting one always
finds oneself bound to some extent by past actions and that one acts in ways that
deliberately bind as far as possible one's own future actions. Wbile one always
l~aurice Merleau-Ponty, "Sartre and Ultrabolshevism," Adven'ures 0/ Ihe Dialeclic, trans.
Joseph Bien (Evanston, IL: Northwestem University Press, 1973), p. 195.
ISlbid., p. 196.
16Sal1re, "Materialism and Revolution," Lilerary and Philosophical &says, trans. Annette
Michelson (New York: Collier Books, 1962), p. 237.
J7Silnone de Beauvoir, The E'hics 0/ An,biguity, trans. Bernard Frechtman (New York: The
Citadel Press, 1964), p. 27.
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remains free to "break" these bonds and to launch a new project that undermines
past projects, tbis change of direction is not easy, given the momentum and all
the "reasons" one has created for oneself by past choices.
Second, one's fundamental cboice of self to a considerable extent binds
one's future choices. If this choice is one that values freedom, it requires an
ensemble of projects and motivations tbat will call for actions in support of
freedom. Thus, one is committed to such actions and to tbe rejection of actions
which limit freedom. The fact that one can call into question one's fundamental
choice and that "conversion" is possible does not mean that doing so is easy nor
does it mean that the recognition of tbis possibility precipitates one into a Iimbo
of paralysis. It does mean, however, tbat tbere is a level of freedom underlying
all that an individual can or does count as a reason for choice.
Play can belp us understand and live witb this fundamental choice, whetber
it is the original making of the choice, if there be such, or the continuing
adherence to the particular choice, or a conversion from that choice. To some
extent, one's fundamental choice is Iike one's decision to playagame; once
made, the choice, Iike the decision to play the game, gives the individual who
so chose good and compelling reasons to act in a particular way or to execute
one move rather than another. Yet the playful spirit out of which came tbe
decision to play is not itself provided thereby with similarly good and
compelling reasons for that decision. In fact, the decision itself may have no
adequate motivation at al1; but such a consideration will not dampen the spirits
of the player. After all, precisely by choosing to play, the player has suspended
the rules of the serious, rules which require such justification for any choice one
may make.
Play as Resolution to Problem of Futility
The problem of futility is, I believe, a more difficult one to resolve and
its resolution more centrally involves play. By examining games, we have seen
that such play either exposes implausible assumptions of, or resolves problems
allegedly confronting, the relativism espoused by Sartre. In agame, a player
participates as if the rules or values of the game have some sort of necessary,
objective reality and validity. At the same time, as long as players are playing
and not so caught up in winning that they mistake the game for something else,
they recognize that these rules and values have no such necessity or objectivity.
288
In other words, one who plays avoids the seriousness of tbose wbo no longer
play. In avoiding this seriousness, such an individual also avoids tbe serious
person's reaction to futility. Even inescapable futility is not an insunnountable
problem for those who play. In play, not only may we spend time and energy
to unbalanee balanced objects without much likelihood of success, but also we
may exert great effort to balance unbalanceable objects and to fill sieves with
water.
Does it make sense, however, to place life and bonor on the line, as did
Sartre and de Beauvoir? Did they, as bas been claimed, thereby slip into
seriousness'l Although people frequently risk their lives in games, we tend to
view play as a frivolous activity, to assume that those who risk their lives in
play are doing so not for the game but for some reward external to the game
itself. With such reasoning, we move into seriousness and thus beg a
fundamental question by assuming that there are ready-made values, some of
which may warrant the risking of life and some of which do not. More
fundamentally, we beg tbe question Sartre deals witb by assuming tbat an
individual'sown life;s valuable, that only something object;vely higher in value
eould possibly warrant an action that risks that life.
If Sartre is correct, we determine the extent to which our Jives are
valuable, as weil as their value vis-a-vis other values. Even the value of freedom
emerges in the context of willing other values, and those values set the
parameters for the valuing of freedom; for example, the freedom willed by tbe
lucid daredevil may be part of a short life, but one lived intensely. The values
created and sustained in play are not frivolous in comparison with those of the
players' lives; values have no existence apart from individual choices. Certainly
there is no hierarchy of values independent of sueh ehoices. Serious human
beings try to convince themselves othelWise, but their eonstemation over the
irrationality of those who play "for keeps· cannot count as a legitimate objection
to the unserious play of those who are authentie.
The interesting thing about playas a resolution to the problem of futi"lity
is that it changes botb the nature and the outeome of the project. Authentie
individuals and groups turn to some extent from impossible goals as such to
what is within their control. This does not mean that impossible goals will be
left behind. It means ralher that, for the authentie individual, such ideals become
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regulative. 18 To take goals as regulative is to take them as guiding behavior
but not as depicting goals actually to be realized. Although individuals and
groups may be unable evet to achieve the hannony and unity represented by
such ideals as God and organism, the ideals nonetheless may guide behavior.
Concretely, tbis would mean that, instead of trying to be, for example, an
identity ofbeing-for-others and being-for-self, individuals would strive to be (for
themselves) what they appear (to others) and to appear to be (to others) what
they are (to themselves). The authentie individual assumes responsibility for and
attempts to harmonize as far as possible those disparate aspects of herself or
himself wbile the individual in bad faith tries to unify, to reduce them without
remainder to one another, and, failing to unify, then uses the impossibility of
such unity as a justification for any and all behavior.
Thus, as long as the city of ends is taken as a non-regulative ideal, that is,
as a goal actually to be realized, ethics faces a dilemma. On the one hand, ifthe
goal is not in fact realizable, in other words, if the goal is merely ideal, then,
as Sartre says, "hope disappears." On the other hand, if the city of ends is
regarded as realizable but only by projecting this possible actualization into some
far-distant future, then the end remains beyond and outside the means and
potentially able to justify any and all means. It would then lead to "the maxim
of violence": "the end justifies the means. "
To avoid defeatism and violence, Sartre proposes that the goal must be
viewed not "as being by relation to the means in the exteriority of indifference
... [but rather] as the organie unity of the means." In other words, such a goal
is not "the last link in the causal series A, B, C, D, E, F ... but ... is the
organie totality of the operation." Because Sartre's resolution of his antinomy
requires that we see the end in the means, and not as totally separate from them,
the means will truly be a "prefiguration of a city of ends":
IIHazel E. Bames, An Existentialist Ethics, (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), pp. 94-95, offen
a similar interpretation of unity or coineidence as a Wregulating idea or principle.· She recognizes
that this move is a Kantian one, since it was Kant who proposed in 7he Moral Law, trans. H. J.
Paton (New Vork: Bames & Noble, Ine., 1963), the way ideas like that of perfeetion are to serve
in morality as regulative ideas. For Kant, however, such ideas were merely empirically impossible,
that is, not in fact Ichievable in a finite time; and, IS I have argued elsewhere, he failed to see or
be concemed with ways the utilization of such regulative ideas in morality might contribute to and
support violence Ind injustice.
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The solution of lhe antinomy is to not distinguiah lhe end from lhe means and to treat
man a. end in lhe same me.sure in which I conaider hirn a. means, lhat i. to say, to
cause hirn to lhink hirnself and 10 will hirnself freely a. mean. in lhe moment to lhe
extenl 10 which I treat hirn a. end and making it known to hirn lhat he is absolule end
in lhe decision itself lhrough which he treata himaelf a. mean•. 19
Altbough we continue to be guided by the impossible, such goals should
be understood and pursued as regulative, and the concrete aims that we form in
their light must take into account circumstances and probabilities. In bad faith,"
individuals may try to aehieve their ultimate goal througb magie and incantatioDS
like one who faints in fear, thereby magically causing the wdisappearaneewof the
threat.20 By fainting, the fearful person relinquishes ~r denies responsibility
for his or her body and its actions and retreats into pure subjectivity. Futility
enters into the fainter's behavior but in a way entirely different from tbe way it
did in the foregoing discussion of the problem of futility. Fainting obliterates
only the awareness of the threat. Although it migbt deceive, and thereby
possibly thwart, an attacking animal by making the object of its attack appear
dead, in other cases it does nothing to remove tbe threat. Rather, it may leave
the one who faints totally vulnerable, unable to resist in any way or to escape
from the threat. The consequences here may be the opposite of the safety and
security sought. The waiter seems to be in a similar position, inasmuch as his
robot-like behavior is and will remain antithetieal to wbat be sought: the more
he becomes object-like, the less he is the subjectivity-as-object he sought to
become.
The opposition between the goals and the actual eonsequences of aetions
makes apparent the moral problem with bad faith, namely, that tbose in bad faith
try to will the end without willing the means. In this sense, consequences can
count aga;nst an individual's actions and choices although, given the ultimate
futility of human actions, consequences can never juslify the value of any other
actions and choices.
What this analysis of consequences means, then, is that Sartre can affirm
a particular way of playing as that appropriate to the authentie individual. Such
19Sal1r~, Cahiers pour une morale, pp. 180, 451, 175, 216.
20Sa11re , lhe En.otions, trans. Bemard Freehtman (New York: Philosophieal Library, 1948),
pp. 62-63.
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individuals accept and affinn the futility of their efforts to actualize their
uItimate goal; yet they continue to do what they can to accomplish it. In lron in
the Soul, for example, Mathieu recognizes the futility of his action and
impending death-that ambushing those particular Nazi soldiers will "merely put
their time-table out by ten minutes! "21
Individuals like Hoederer (Dirty Hands) and Genet (Saint Genet)
acknowledge and accept their freedom and the ultimate futility of their actions,
yet enter the fray, resolved to control and change what they can. Althoughthey
may neither control nor change the course of history, nevertheless they act.
They realize their finitude and essential ambiguity and work within these even
while striving toward an impossible goal. Mathieu sums up this attitude as he
indicts himself and a cohort for their previous political noninvolvement.
Implicitly recognizing that their participation in politics might not have prevented
the present confrontation, he still affirms: "At least you would have done all you
could. "22 As Sartre says in Cahiers pour une morale:
The historieal agent oughtto aeeeptthat his work prolongs itself only by proposition
and that the spirit whieh animates it will eontinue to aet only in the manner of a
residue. But It the same time, he oughllo lalce all precautions to retard 19 long IS
possible the moment of alienation.23
Play as Revolutionary Activity
Finally, the revolutionary possibilities of play should not be ignored.
Virginia Woolf hinted at these when she observed the revolutionary potential of
women's laughter and their tuming away from the all-too-serious pomp and
circumstance of those in positions of power.24 Play, Iike laughter and tuming
2lSartre , Iron in the Soul, trans. Gerard Hopkins (Hlnnondswolth, Middlesex: Penguin Books,
1971), p. 222.
12lbid ., p. 87.
2JSartre• C"ahiers pour une morale, p. 54.
24virginia Wootf, 1hree Guineas (New York: Hareourt Braee Jovanovieh, 1938), pp. 19-21,
150.
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away, involves a disconnection from the seriousness ofthose for whom values
are given and not created. Tbe playful individual "makes light" of those valu~,
indeed of all values, by recognizing freedom astheir ultimate foundation.
Tbe obvious danger of such playfulness, of course, is that play, like anger,
requires what Marilyn Frye calls "uptake, " though perhaps not in quite the same
way. At least, play, Iike anger, requires uptake if it is to be revolutionary, if it
is to make any difference vis-a-vis the stlllctures and activities of oppression.
Just as Frye recognizes that a woman's anger at a car mechanie may simply be
dismissed as "crazy, ,,25 so, too, may the playful treatment of serious and
oppressive values by the oppressed be regarded as mad or childlike. Or it may
just be ignored.
Even when the play is noticed and recognized for what it is, it is all too
Iikely to be only momentarily unsettling, a dis-ease for the serious that is quicldy
replaced by the familiar and, for them, comfortable values and order of the
ordinary. In fact, and far more dangerous, this temporary unsettling may by
used by the forces of oppression as a safety-valve for the purpose of releasing
tensions in the oppressed and even as a means of relieving misgivings in the
oppressors themselves. If everyone leaves the playful activity with a sense of
distance from and moral superiority to the oppressive values embedded in the
social structures, then those structures have been reinforced rather than
challenged by the play. Such play is clearly part and parcel of the status quo and
not a revolutionary force against it.
Mikhail Bakhtin points to both the revolutionary potential and the
reactionary uses of play in his discussion of camival. Although he is interested
in the "camival sense of the world" embodied in same literature, he recognizes
that camivals are a primary locus in real Iife of this spirit with its characteristic
"atmosphere ofjoyful relalivity. " In the camival, as he says, "... life is drawn
out of its usual rot, it is to some extent 'Iife tumed inside out,' 'the reverse side
of the world t •••• " Tbe "Iaws, prohibitions, and restrictions 'that determine the
stiucture and order of ordinary, that is noncamival, Iife are suspended during
camival." This means, he says, "what is suspended first of all is hierarchical
structure and all tbe fonns of terror, reverence, piety, and etiquette connected
with it-that is, everything resulting from socio-hierarchical inequality oe any
~ariJyn Frye. -A Note on Anger. - 1he Polilics 01 Realily: Essays in Feminisl 1heory
(Tromansburg, NY: The Crossing Press, 1983), pp. 88-89.
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other form of inequality among people (including age)." In other words, "[a]ll
distance between people is suspended, and ·a special carnival category goes into
effect: free and familiar contaet among people. "26 During such festivals, "all
participants entered, as it were, the utopian kingdom of absolute equality and
freedom," albeit only for a "strictly limited" time.27
Camival life sounds very like a temporary embodiment of the kingdom of
ends where each may, as Sartre says, appeal to everyone else for aid and where
oppressive hierarchies are abolished. In fact, Sartre bimself suggests something
like this in his description of festival as "liberation from the spirit of
seriousness, the expenditure of ecODOmiCS, the ruin of hierarchy, and the
absorption of the other by the Same, of the objective by intersubjectivity, of
order by disorder. "28
Although camival or festival may unsettle hierarcby and the spirit of
seriousness, for the revolutionary, at least, something important is missing.
Wbat is missing is lasting effect on society and on its oppressive hierarchies. As
Bakhtin observes, camival is a form of ritual laughter, and such laughter is
always linked with death and rebirth. Earthly authorities are ridiculed and put
to the test in order "to force them to renew themselves. "29 Unless the
authorities are tolaUy unbending and unwilling to make even the most minor of
cODcessions, such renewal favors and strengthens the status quo ratber than
challenging it in any really fundamental way. When the camival ends,
oppressive hierarchies are not substantially weakened but rather are purified and
even strengthened by having endured the challenge. Thus, it would seem, they
are more firmly entrenched than ever.
One problem with real camival is that it is ritual. As ritual, the camival
is removed from real Iife. Oe Beauvoir notes this problem when she says, "The
~ikhail Bakhtin, Problems 0/ Dosloevs/cy 's Poelics, trans. Caryl Emerson (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1984), pp. 107, 122-23.
27Bakhtin, Rabelais anti His World, trans. Helene Iswolsky (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1984), pp. 264-65.
28Sartre, Cahiers pour une morale, p. 388.
29Bakhlin, ProbletTlS 0/ Dosloevslcy's Poetics, p. 127.
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moment of detachment, the pure affirmation of the subjective present are only
abstractions; the joy becomes exhausted, dnmkenness subsides inm fatigue, and
one finds himself with bis hands empty because one can never possess the
present: that is what gives festivals their pathetic and deceptive character. ,,30
In addition, the camival is not only separate from real life but also, as a
ritual, it has a clearly demarcated beginning and end. Part of what allows the
sense of playfulness such license, even for those in power, is that everyone
knows the camival will end and something very like business as usual will take
its place. Some features of that business may change as a result of the carnival,
but everyone can be assured that its fundamental aspects will not change and that
all will generally be in the same hierarchical power an:angements once again.
Commoners may be treated momentarily as kings and vice versa, but there is
little chance that the hilarity of the moment will pennanently result in any such
displacement.
Finally, real camival frequently does not achieve tbe liberation of whicb
its laugbter is capable, according to Bakhtin, because it may lack tbe awareness
necessary for it to express "a critical and clearly defined opposition.· Without
sufficient awareness, individuals and periods, like the Middle Ages, may allow
to exist in their consciousness "side by side but never merg(ing]" botb "the
serious and the laughing aspect(s)" of the world, botb the official and the
camival, both the pious and the grotesque. With awareness, Bakhtin believes,
laughter can liberale "not only from external censorship but first of all from the
great interior censor; it liberates from the fear that developed in man during
thousands of years: fear of the sacred, of prohibitions, of the past, of power. "
Thus, he says: "[I]t unveils the material bodily principle in its true meaning.
Laughter opened men's eyes on that which is new, on tbe future." In this way,
over time, laughter helped transform "old truth and autbority into a Mardi Gras
dummy, a comic monster that the laughing crowd rends to pieces in the
marketplace.•31
What we leam about the revolutionary potential of camival, then, is both
positive and negative. Positively, camival can be seen as providing an
embodiment of sorts, however temporary, of something like the kingdom of
30de Beauvoir, The Elhics 0/Ambiguily, pp. 126-27.
31Bakhlin, Rabelais and His World, pp. 96, 94, 213.
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ends. It offers avision of the way play can unsettle oppressive hierarchies and
create an openness otherwise seldom experienced. Also, it provides a way for
an individual to liberate himself or herself from the hold of extemally imposed
and serious values.
At the same time, though, we leam what play cannot be if it is to be truly
revolutionary, that is, if it is to disrupt the structures upholding those values. In
particular, we see the dangers of a ritualized play, one that is not ongoing and
that has not developed its awareness into clear opposition. Such play, while
mocking and temporarily unsettling the status quo, is ultimately no challenge to
it, indeed is quite likely to strengthen it by serving as a safety valve, providing
harmless release even for potentially quite disroptive tensions in the society.
From these accounts of camival and festival, I conclude, certain conditions
must be met if play's revolutionary potential is to be realized. First and
foremost, it must emerge from clear, critical, and oppositional awareness. This
condition is essential if the activity is to achieve even the players' liberation
from intemalized censors, much less the disruption of institutionalized structures
of oppression.
If the activity is to have any chance of unsettling the status quo, other
eonditions must be met as weil. Thus, a second condition is that the playful
activity be able to gel itself recogoized as play. Oppressed groups 00 doubt will
have great difficulty with this condition inasmuch as their aetivity is likely to be
characterized from the outset as child- or animal-Iike and they themselves as
somewhat simple-minded. In such circumstances, even open caricature of the
serious roles, regulations, and behavior will generally be laken as worshipful
imitation rather than as joyful relativizing of the serious.
Third, the play must not serve as a safety valve within the structure of the
status quo; in other words, it must not provide an unthreatening venting of
tensions that might otherwise erupt and seriously disrupt existing oppressive
structures. Given the tendency of the status quo to co-opt all antagonists and
challenges, revolutionary play will have difficulty meeting this condition.
Finally, if play is to be revolutionary, it must be ongoing. As long as it
has a clearly delineated and anticipated beginning and end separating it from the
rest of life, it will not ultimately disropt and can safely be indulged to break the
monotony, to vent discontent, and to show how strong the present system iso
Thus, to be effective as a revolutionary strategy, play must eateh people off
guard. It must occur at inopportune moments.
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To clarify the last of these conditions, Kierkegaard's method of indirect
discourse may be instructive. Kierkegaard's strategy was 10 play the role of idler
to the hilt and (albeit somewhat transparently) to -hide- behind pseudonyms so
that his words would catch the reader unaware and affect her or him before
rationalizations and other defenses could be constructed. His models for such
discourse include the Old Testament prophet Nathan who told King David a
story conceming an individual whose behavior paralleled David's "taking" of
Bathsheba from her husband Uriah. Wben David responded with outrage against
the individual in the story, Nathan looked at David and said, -Thou art the
man."
Although Kierkegaard's behavior as he plays the .idler is itself playful and
his words supposedly are designed to turn his hearers within themselves, to
make them aware of themselves as individuals and of their freedom, his use of
play remains too much in the arena of individual solutions for it to be useful as
a revolutionary model. Although his method would undercut serlousness, bis
goal was to turn his audience into lonely individuals, not to undermine an
oppressive status quo. If play is to be revolutionary, it must reverse the model
offered by Kierkegaard. Instead of playing the idler or buffoon, the
revolutionary player would probably do better generally to appear to be as
ordinary as possible so that intermittent and irreverent mocking of the ordinary
has the greatest possible unsettling effect.
Various mocking strategies have been proposed. Luce Irigaray, according
to Rosemarie Tong, suggests exaggeration. Recognizing that women exist as
images in men's eyes, she proposes that women "... take those images and
reflect them back to men in magnified proportions. " By overdoing these images
she hopes to effect their undoing. This strategy is not without its perlls since,
as she recognizes, "[t]he distinction between mimicking the patriarchal definition
of woman in order to subvert it and merely fulfillingthis definition is not
clear. ,,32 This seems especially problematic given that we live in a society
where images, particularly those of women, offered by Ho11ywood, by the
media, and by religious fundamentalism are frequently so extreme that it is
difficult to conceive of further magnification. Wbile feminists would no doubt
find it jolting to encounter a real-Iife Gone w;th the Wind Mammy or heavy-
breathing Marilyn Monroe sex-goddess, it would probably take a lot to
3"00g, Fen.inisl 1houghl (Boulder, Colorado: Weslview Press, 1989), pp. 228-29.
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"magnify" the "proportions" in those images and probably a lot more to achieve
the effect for which lrigaray hopes. A culture constantly fed such caricatures
seems far likelier to respond approvingly to real-Iife ernbodiments thereof, even
exaggerated ones, if such are possible. However, the feminist activist/cornedy
group Ladies Against Wornen (LAW) seems to be exploring creatively the
possibilities of mocking through playful exaggeration, with the motto "I'd ratber
be ironing," signs like "My home is bis castle," "Sperm are people, too," and
chants like "Hit us again, harder, harder!" The effects of these on wornen may
be generally salutary, but it remains to be seen if such play can significantly
unsettle the views being lampooned.
A thought-provoking suggestion comes from Micheie Le Doeuff. In
discussing her childhood passion for Shakespeare-"especially for the characters
of the fools"-she confesses that she wished to be eitber Feste or King Lear's
Fool when she grew up, avocation she gave up when she realized that "life is
not as weil written as it would have been if Shakespeare had taken charge of it. "
In philosophy, she later found sornething similar to the "Ianguage of fools, "
sometbing very close to "their sarcastic and corrosive utterances, their
unseasonable taste for truth without pomposity, their corruption of words and
their art of impertinence which forces authority, sometimes royal authority, to
enter into their irony.... " This "foolery," she found, was compatible with Iife
as it existed outside of Shakespearean plays, was open even to wornen, and was
completely at odds with the respect for academic hierarchy and the great authors
with which academicians had replaced "Socrates' irreverence." Later, she
mentions approvingly a statement worn by some French feminists, roughly
equivalent to "'We do not dare to be ridiculous enough, and it may kill us. ,"33
This emphasis on foolery and the ridiculous seems to connect with Le
Doeuffs method, a method of exposure and ridicule-"to show that where
women are concemed the leamed utter, and institutions let them utter, words
which fall clearly below their own usual standards of validation. "34 While this
strategy is that of a worthwhile and philosophically sound project, relatively few
men are likely to feel the bite of her mocking exposure. The "academicism" to
3~ichele Le DoeufT, Hipparehia's Choiee: An Essay Coneeming Women, Philosophy, eie,
Irans. TriS18 Selous (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1991), pp. 9-10, 85.
34/bid., p. 37.
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which she points is so firmly entrenched that such irreverence, particularly when
it comes from women, is usually ignored or dismissed.
Tong cites Dorothy Dinnerstein's recognition that "women have played the
part of court jesters, poking fun at the games men play; and women's
irreverence has served to release the tension that ripples through the world of
enterprise. " Because of this release of tension, "things have never seemed bad
enough for us to change the course of history. ,,35 In fact, women's irreverence
seems, to many men, nothing more than Iightheartedness, a necessary antidote
to their own seriousness. Tbus, women's irreverence alone is clearly not
enough. Only if it is relentlessly unexpected and inappropriate (thereby satisfying
the last condition) does it stand any chance at all of unsetUing, and then probably
only a small one. Very Iikely, such play is more useful for developing the
morale and vision of the players than it is for changing oppressive institutions
and those who seriously uphold them.
Even though the revolutionary potential of play is Iikely to be more
indirect than direct, nonetheless that potential together with its other functions
renders it very significant for those who are trying to relate in non-oppressive
ways. Hoagland offers one compelling example of play within community when
she discusses the importance of clowns in Anne Cameron's Daughters 0/Copper
Woman. Reminiscing about her Indian community "in the days before the
invaders came," Granny observes that clowns, ideally without meanness or
hostility, were needed and used "to help us allieam the best ways to get along
with each other." By simply mimicking the serious gestures of others, clowns
enabled people to see themselves as others see them, an important self-
recognition apparently made more forceful by the means of presentation. Even
a clown would occasionally find another clown in tow: "Sometimes a clown
would find another clown taggin ' along behind, imitatin', and then the first one
knew that maybe somethin' was gettin' out of hand, and maybe the clown was
bein' mean or usin' her position as a clown to push people around and sharpen
her own axe for her own reasons. "36
3~on&, Fenain;sl Thoughl, p. 161.
36Anne Cameron, Daughlers 0/ Copper Woman CYancouver, B. C.: PreIs Gang Publishers,
1981), p. 110.
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Moreover, as Maria Lugones recognizes, play provides a bridge for
individuals whose~ "worlds" are quite different. Access to one another, absolutely
necessary for understanding and communication, is barred to the serious, to
those wbo would uphold the mies of the status quo, to those who would
conquer. Only those who are open to being fools, who do not worry about
competence and self-importance, wbo reject norms as sacred, and who delight
in ambiguity, can understand what it is to be someone quite different and what
it is to be ourselves in tbat individual's eyes.37
Such "'world'-travelling" is essential for those wbo oppose oppression in
all of its ramifications. On the one hand, it is an unavoidable step in the
understanding of oppression since without it one continues to participate in tbe
stmctures of dominance and oppression by forcing the reality and experiences
of others into limited frameworks which are applied to others witb an arrogance
Iike that of the dominant, an arrogance whicb one may resist but at the same
time perpetuate. On the other hand, playful "'world'-travelling" continually
reveals to us and keeps us open to the complexity of the other with whom we
wish to share a world in which each is respected as an end and in which eacb
can appeal to all the others.
Finally, if nothing else, as Anne Tristan and Annie de Pisan observe, the
laughter connected with revolutionary activity adds a note of levity and joy and
thereby does change the world, making it a Iittle less dismal, a little less sinister,
introducing a politics not itself "as sad and sorry an affair as everything
else. "38 Such a <:hange, indeed, may be vital if revolutionaries are to be able
to keep before themselves the ideal society toward which they work and to see
intimations of their ideal, however smalI, in their accomplishments. As long as
such change is not mistaken tor change in the objective structures of oppression,
laughter is an important part of revolution.
37Maria Lugones, "Playfulness, 'World'-Travelling, and Loving Perception," Hypatia, Vol. 2,
No. 2 (Summer 1987), pp. 15-17.
38Anne Tristan Ind Annie de Pisan, "Tales from the Women's Movement," French Fem;n;sI
1houghl: A Reader, t~d. Toril Moi (New York: BasH Blackwelllnc., 1981), p. 67.
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Conclusion
While play is vital to those who try to free themselves and others from
seriousness and from the oppressive structures maintained by such, it is
important to note that play may accomplisb mucb more. Not only does play
offer players a way to achieve distance from the seriously-held oppressive values
of tbe status quo, but also it enables those who play at least momentarily to
glimpse a kingdom of ends wbere the freedom of everyone is acknowledged and
wbere oppressive hierarcbies are undone. In addition, play, as we bave seen,
resolves some serious problems confronted by an ethics of freedom vis-a-vis
relativism and futility. Even though it has limited pote~tial as a revolutionary
strategy, play is nonetbeless vital to ethics.
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